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Can negative electricity prices encourage
inefﬁcient electrical energy storage devices?
EDWARD BARBOUR*†, GRANT WILSON‡, PETER HALL‡ AND
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†School of Chemical Engineering, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK; ‡Department of
Chemical and Biological Engineering, University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, UK; §School of Electronic,
Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
This paper explores whether negative electricity prices can change the rationale that efﬁcient energy
storage devices are more economical for arbitrage in electricity markets. An established model
algorithm to determine the maximum available arbitrage revenue and optimum schedule of electri-
cal energy storage (EES) operation is used to simulate storage with a time-series of electricity
prices which includes some negative prices. Our results suggest that at any likely frequency of neg-
ative electricity prices, inefﬁcient EES is not encouraged, and can only be encouraged for EES
devices with very low energy capacity to power ratios.
Keywords: Energy storage; Negative electricity prices
1. Introduction
There has been a growing interest in negative spot prices for wholesale electrical energy
and the impact they may have in providing additional revenue for electrical energy storage
(EES) operators.
One revenue stream for EES is from energy arbitrage; buying and charging a storage
device at times of low-cost electricity and discharging and selling it at a later time period
at a higher price. All energy storage devices suffer some sort of energy penalty (round-trip
efﬁciency loss), which is dependent on both the technology and manner of operation. EES
can proﬁtably use these price differentials if the cost of operation (including the cost of
the electricity used in charging) is less than the selling price by a given percentage. The
price uplift must cover the round-trip efﬁciency losses, as well as operation, maintenance
and investment costs of the energy storage device. Several researchers have examined the
ability of storage to derive revenue via arbitrage [1–3] and conclude that high round-trip
storage efﬁciencies are essential in making any storage device economically attractive. No
researchers previously have considered the effect of negative electricity prices. This paper
considers whether the rationale to have energy storage devices with higher round-trip
efﬁciencies is valid when subject to negative electricity prices.
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1.1. What are negative electricity prices?
In recent years, several wholesale electricity markets have exhibited the use of negative
electricity prices; when generators pay to have their electricity consumed, whereas in nor-
mal market conditions of positive prices, generators are paid for their electricity. For exam-
ple, in the German day-ahead market in 2013, there were negative prices in 48 h, zero
prices in 23 h and the price was below 10 €/MWh in 326 h, whereas in the German intra-
day market, there were negative prices in 79 h, zero prices in 2 h and the price was below
10 €/MWh in 355 h. In each case, these values are out of a total of 8760 h [4]. Clearly,
negative prices occur in both the intraday and the day-ahead market, and a storage opera-
tor able to trade in either of these markets could seek to take advantage of these opportune
prices.
The trading of wholesale electricity through power exchanges is meant to provide a
transparent method to ‘discover’ market reference prices for electricity. Typically, the
power exchanges match willing buyers and sellers of electrical energy using predeﬁned
blocks or electrical energy or ‘products’. The reference prices are then calculated by the
power exchanges with agreed formulae that typically weight qualifying trades of electricity
[5]. In many liberalised electrical energy markets, these reference prices are used to inﬂu-
ence other trades of electrical energy that do not take place through the power exchanges,
e.g. bilateral trades. It is thought, therefore, that the reference prices are an important basis
for the entire electrical market, not just the trades that take place through the power
exchanges. In Great Britain (GB), these weightings and the criteria for qualifying trades
are formalised and can be changed by the Imbalance and Settlement Group [6] to reﬂect
changing market conditions or desired outcomes from the reference price.
Different market structures provide different means of discovery of a market price for
electrical energy, with a pool structure still being common in the USA. There used to be a
pool structure in GB for its electrical energy market. All trades of electrical energy hap-
pened through the pool, and were based on a merit order to match the forecast demand
with the bids that generators had provided. This was effectively a day-ahead market with
the system operator accepting or rejecting bids in order to match supply and demand. All
generators were paid the same price for their electricity, regardless of their bid price, which
was set by the most expensive bid that was accepted. This all changed when GB intro-
duced a different market structure, the ‘New Electricity Trading Agreements’ in 2001.
Newbery and Green have comprehensively described the different market structures [7–9].
In practical terms, a higher price should encourage the generation of electricity from
additional higher marginal price plant, whereas a lower price should discourage generators
with higher marginal costs from being active in the market at that time. Negative electric-
ity prices represent particular times where the market conditions suggest an oversupply of
electricity relative to the forecast demand. The intraday or day-ahead wholesale market is
expecting a position of oversupply, and can be viewed as a strong signal for either demand
to increase, or for generation to decrease, or both.
Typically, there are also separate markets from the pool or the power exchange markets
to allow the system operator to undertake balancing actions in close to real time, and in
GB, this is known as the balancing market [10]. The system operator has overall control
over this real-time window, and can accept bids or offers from generation or indeed suppli-
ers to add or reduce their generation or demand. This is separate from and crucially differ-
ent to the day-ahead or intraday power exchange markets for wholesale electricity, as the
only counterparty to any trade in the real-time period is the system operator. Trades are
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therefore forbidden between other parties in real time and although storage can also proﬁt
from this balancing market, it is not discussed here.
1.2. How do negative spot prices arise?
Several European countries now allow negative electricity prices to occur in their electric-
ity markets: Germany/Austria, France, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and the Nordpool
markets. In GB, negative electricity prices are not supported in the intraday market, but
are allowed on the day-ahead market (By September 2014, this development had not yet
occurred.) Because the lowest price limit for participants in the GB intraday market is
zero, negative prices cannot occur as market participants cannot enter a potential trade with
a value below zero. This lower limit is, however, being investigated, and may well change
to harmonise with the day-ahead market, where the lower limit is minus £400 (a negative
price of £400). If this happens, the GB intraday spot market price would then have the
potential to become negative.
Two mechanisms can give rise to a power exchange and a market structure for accom-
modating negative spot prices.
The ﬁrst mechanism occurs when an inﬂexible electricity generation mix coincides with
a low demand, giving rise to a potential oversupply. This can be caused when generators
decide that the cost associated with shutting down and restarting of their generation plant
is greater than the cost of paying an external party to take the generated electricity for a
limited period. Clearly, this is not a ﬁnancially stable business strategy for longer periods.
This can happen when a thermal generator wishes to maintain a minimal stable generation
for a time to avoid a slow and expensive shut-down-and-restart cycle. This avoided shut-
down could keep the plant ready to participate in another more proﬁtable market at a later
time (e.g. the balancing market), or make the plant available at peak price times of day.
Overall, the generator is prepared to accept negative prices (to pay) over a limited period
in order to receive greater revenue (to be paid) at a later time: the net revenue is positive.
The second mechanism results from subsidies a generator may collect from the genera-
tion of electricity; e.g. a feed-in-tariff to support renewable generation. In this case, a gen-
erator (e.g. of wind power) could reduce its sale price to become negative, in the
knowledge that it will receive a subsidy of a greater value to cover the negative price on a
unit basis. The generator would still receive a net positive payment for the electricity it
generates when the traded negative wholesale price and the subsidy are aggregated. As an
example, the German feed-in-tariff subsidy for onshore wind is about €89/MWh [11]; even
if the wind generator bid into the market at -€10/MWh the net unit price it would receive
would be €79/MWh. The overall nature of this mechanism is similar to the ﬁrst one: the
net beneﬁt to the generator is positive, even though there may be a negative wholesale
price.
Negative electricity prices mean that generators will pay other parties to take the elec-
tricity that they generate. Although negative electricity prices could occur in the ﬁrst
instance without renewable generation, renewables – a source of variable generation – sig-
niﬁcantly add to the likelihood of such prices. Genoese et al. [12] studied negative elec-
tricity prices on the German day-ahead spot market and found that of the global variables
that characterise the market, wind had the highest correlation with negative electricity
prices.
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There are several economic arguments for the accommodation of negative electricity
prices, such as reducing the reward for wrong-time renewable energy; essentially causing
them to pay back some of the subsidy as a result of their inﬂexibility. Another reason is to
allow for better market coupling between other European markets that do support negative
prices. An alternative view, however, is that negative spot prices indicate that a subsidy
regime is distorting the wholesale electricity market and this should be seen as harmful
[13]. This view has much to do with analysis of a pool-based market and the assumption
that wind generation is crowding out conventional thermal plant.
The mechanisms that can lead to negative wholesale electricity price in the spot market
are a very different phenomenon from generators being paid to shut off generation to bal-
ance the network. In GB, the balancing market is a wholly separate market that is driven
by real-time transmission network constraints as well as locational balancing between
actual generation and actual demand (as opposed to notiﬁed generation and forecast
demand). One contentious issue in the UK is that for wind generators these balancing mar-
ket payments usually result in signiﬁcantly higher payments per MWh than the subsidy
itself is worth [14]. Wind farm operators claim this is due to costs associated with switch-
ing the turbines off and on as well as additional wear and tear, although so far no break-
down of wind curtailment costs is in the public domain.
1.3. Negative electricity prices and energy storage
Negative prices can have a profound consequence for energy storage; instead of purchas-
ing electricity to sell back to the market at a later time, storage is paid to take electricity
that is sold back to the market at a later period. Accordingly, if there are no ﬁxed storage
operational costs, it is always beneﬁcial for storage to charge using this negatively priced
electricity, irrespective of the positive selling price. That negative electricity prices should
encourage the participation of energy storage in the electricity market is often observed.
This is not surprising because negative prices represent a lack of ﬂexibility in the electric-
ity network, and EES adds ﬂexibility. Yet, there may be a risk in relying on negative
prices to encourage energy storage, as they have the potential to reward inefﬁcient energy
storage devices more than the most efﬁcient ones.
1.4. The methods through which negative electricity prices can encourage inefﬁciency
It seems bizarre that a less-efﬁcient energy storage device could generate higher revenues
than a more-efﬁcient device, but this is possible when negative electricity prices occur.
This is because an inefﬁcient storage device requires more electricity to charge fully, and
so the presence of negative electricity prices introduces the possibility that an inefﬁcient
storage device will produce a greater amount for its operator than a more-efﬁcient storage
device of the same scale and charging rate. This difference in income when charging can
be sufﬁciently large that the equivalent but more-efﬁcient device may not be able to com-
pensate this ﬁnancial differential when discharging. This is often misinterpreted to con-
clude that negative electricity prices always encourage inefﬁcient EES. But this situation
can only arise if the capacity of the devices is small enough that the more-efﬁcient device
becomes fully charged before the end of the duration of negative prices. If this is not the
case, then the more-efﬁcient device will always be able to derive a greater revenue, as both
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devices will receive the same income from charging (as their rates of charging are the
same) and the more-efﬁcient device will receive a larger income from energy discharge.
If the period during which negative electricity prices occur is sustained long enough,
however, so that the efﬁcient energy storage device becomes fully charged whilst the nega-
tive price period is still available, then it is possible for an inefﬁcient device to generate a
larger revenue. For example, consider a storage device with a capacity of 2 MWh and a
rated charge and discharge power of 1 MW. If there are more than two hours with negative
prices, then a less-efﬁcient device may produce a greater revenue. This is because a less-
efﬁcient device can exploit more consecutive periods of negative electricity prices, whereas
the 100% efﬁcient device can only exploit two consecutive negative electricity price peri-
ods before it becomes fully charged. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 1, comparing a 100% efﬁ-
cient and a 50% efﬁcient device. Positive denotes buying (charging – adding energy to the
store) and negative denotes selling (discharging energy from the store).
Figure 1(a) and (b) show the energy bought and energy sold per period for the 100 and
50% efﬁcient storage devices, respectively. Figure 1(c) and (d) show the quantity of energy
stored at the end of each period. It is assumed that with a round-trip efﬁciency of 50% the
charging process and the discharging process each have an equal efﬁciency of 70.71%.
Therefore, only 70.71% of the energy bought is stored, and only 70.71% of the energy
removed from the store can be sold. It can be seen that because of these losses the 50%
Figure 1. (a) Charging and discharging schedule for 1 MW 2MWh 100% round-trip efﬁciency storage device.
(b) Charging and discharging schedule for 1 MW 2MWh 50% round-trip efﬁciency storage device. (c) Energy
stored corresponding to ﬁgure 1(a). (d) Energy stored corresponding to ﬁgure 1(b).
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efﬁcient device can exploit a larger proportion of the negative prices. Therefore, although
it discharges less electricity at positive prices, it generates a higher overall revenue.
The situation becomes ever more bizarre if storage is allowed to charge and discharge at
negative prices. Consider two successive periods with the same negative electricity price.
One way for any energy storage device that is not 100% efﬁcient to generate revenue
could be to charge at the ﬁrst period and discharge at the second period. Thus, the storage
would be rewarded for the charging, and penalised for the discharging; but because of the
round trip losses the quantity of energy discharged would be less than that used to charge.
In result, even if the price of electricity remained unchanged (at its negative value) the rev-
enue gained by charging at the ﬁrst period would outweigh the revenue lost for discharg-
ing at the second period. Hence, if storage operators exploited this method of revenue
generation, it would actively encourage inefﬁciency.
This is obviously undesirable and policy would no doubt require removal of this per-
verse incentive, by imposing further penalties on energy storage devices that choose to dis-
charge at negative price periods.
The second method of storage devices choosing to discharge with negative electricity
prices is likely to represent a very extreme case. It is more informative to look at the case
in which storage can charge at negative electricity prices but will discharge at high positive
electricity prices. Accordingly, we use a model algorithm that calculates the maximum pos-
sible revenue available to energy storage devices through arbitrage, which buys low-price
electricity and sells it at times of higher prices that are positive. Hence, the model will not
generate revenue from the second mechanism of both buying and selling at negative price
periods. The chosen arbitrage model has been adapted from the paper by Connelly et al.
[15]. The model is written in MATLAB and the code can be downloaded [16].
2. Simulations of energy storage and negative electricity prices
Given a time-series of electricity prices, charging and discharging limits, a round-trip efﬁ-
ciency and some maximum storage capacity, the algorithm returns the schedule of opera-
tion of the storage device that delivers the maximum revenue, along with the maximum
revenue value. Connelly et al. [15] provide a detailed description of the model algorithm
used in the simulations; and for completeness, a brief description is given here:
(1) The model algorithm identiﬁes the maximum price in the time-series and marks it
as MAXhour.
(2) A range around MAXhour is then identiﬁed in which it is physically possible for
the storage device to charge. If the range is empty or only constitutes MAXhour
itself, then MAXhour is removed from the time-series. It is possible for the charg-
ing period to occur after the discharging period only if there is sufﬁcient energy
stored at all the times between the discharge and the charge period so that the min-
imum energy within this period is greater than zero.
(3) The minimum price hour within this range is identiﬁed (denoted MINhour) and the
cost of charging at this hour and discharging at MAXhour is calculated. If this
action generates a net positive revenue – i.e. if the cost of charging at MINhour is
less than the revenue derived from discharging the stored energy at MAXhour –
then this action is implemented in the storage devices schedule, provided that it
does not violate any charging power, discharging power or energy capacity
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constraints. The value of these constraints is called the ‘Storage bottlenecks’.
Equation (1) summarises the revenue condition:
price ðMINhourÞ\grt  price ðMAXhourÞ (1)
ηrt is the round-trip storage efﬁciency. If there is no revenue incentive, then
MINhour and MAXhour are removed from the time-series.
(4) The algorithm then checks whether the storage operation has reached capacity at
either MAXhour or MINhour and if true removes these hours from the price time-
series.
(5) This process is repeated until all the hours have been removed from the price
time-series.
Simulation results are presented for a typical single day’s worth of electricity prices and
for a year of electricity prices. The price used is the UK 2013 Market Index price, or the
‘spot market’ price, which is modiﬁed to include several hours with negative electricity
prices. Figure 2 shows a ﬂow chart depicting the operation of the energy storage arbitrage
model. It is assumed that the storage device is a ‘price taker’ and thus, its operation does
not inﬂuence the price of electricity. This is a reasonable assumption given the current
push to develop small–medium-scale EES devices and encourage their participation in lib-
eralised electricity markets. Of course, with a large enough capacity of EES this assump-
tion will be invalid.
It should be stressed that the simulations in this paper serve mainly to illustrate what the
effects of negative electricity prices might be, rather than being a rigorous prediction of
where these negative prices might occur.
2.1. Daily simulation
The electricity price used to generate the typical daily electricity prices is the UK Market
Index Price (spot price) 2013. The 2013 UK Market Index Price can be downloaded [17].
To generate a set of typical daily prices, the mean price at each half-hour period for each
day of the year 2013 was calculated, accounting for one short day (Sunday, 31st March)
and one long day (Sunday, 27th October). For this typical daily price, the minimum price
for a half-hour period is £35/MWh and the maximum price is £66/MWh. To illustrate the
effect of negative electricity prices, the typical daily prices are modiﬁed by shifting the
prices between 3 am and 6 am by −£70/MWh so that they become negative and roughly
equal in magnitude.
The model algorithm is used to calculate the maximum arbitrage revenue available to an
energy storage device with set capacity (200 kWh) and charging and discharging power
limits (50 kW) and a given round-trip efﬁciency. Figure 3 shows the optimal charging/dis-
charging schedule of a 75% EES device with the unmodiﬁed typical daily electricity
prices. As is intuitive, the model charges during the times of lowest electricity prices and
discharges at the time of the highest prices. This optimum schedule generates a modest
£2.32 over the ‘typical’ day.
Figure 4 shows a surface plot of the total revenue generated over the average day when
the energy storage efﬁciency is varied from 5% to 100% and the capacity is varied from
25 to 250 kWh (0.5–5 h). It can be seen that a higher capacity and higher round-trip
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efﬁciency lead to larger revenues. No revenue can be generated with a round-trip storage
efﬁciency below around 50%. This is to be expected as during the example typical day the
minimum price for electricity was £35/MWh and the maximum was £70/MWh. Hence, a
storage device with less than 53% efﬁciency could not exploit the maximum price differ-
ential observed and thus could not generate any revenue from arbitrage, regardless of the
capacity of the store.
We now explore the case in which the price of electricity between the hours of 3 and 6
am is modiﬁed by −£70/MWh, so that the prices at these times become negative. Figure 5
Figure 2. Flow chart of the optimisation model operation.
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illustrates the modiﬁed typical daily prices. The optimum schedule of operation of the
same 75% efﬁcient EES device as used in ﬁgure 4 above can now generate a revenue of
£12.82 – nearly a 500% increase in available revenue.
Figure 6 shows a surface plot equivalent to that in Figure 4 but using the modiﬁed elec-
tricity prices (as shown in Figure 5). It is ﬁrstly notable that with the presence of negative
electricity prices there is no efﬁciency threshold for the ability to generate revenue. This is
to be expected as now storage is being paid for both charging and discharging, and so can
generate revenue even without being able to return any electricity during discharge. Inter-
estingly, it is also observed that at low storage capacity to power ratios, inefﬁcient storage
devices have larger maximum available revenues compared to higher efﬁciency devices.
Figure 3. Optimal charging/discharging schedule for a 75% efﬁcient ES device using the average daily spot mar-
ket electricity price 2009.
Figure 4. Total revenue generated in pounds sterling by the action of a storage system with charging/discharging
limits of 50 kW.
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This is caused by their lower efﬁciency, which allows them to exploit more periods of
negative electricity prices. As the storage capacity increases this effect is negated and the
higher efﬁciency devices always have higher available revenues.
2.2. Yearly simulation
For the yearly simulation, the 2013 market index (spot) price data are again used. Firstly,
the effect of device efﬁciency against available arbitrage revenue is demonstrated on the
Figure 5. Illustrating the ‘typical’ daily prices modiﬁed to include some negative prices, where it can be seen
that between 3 and 6 am, prices are negative.
Figure 6. Revenue available when price ﬁle input is altered so that the prices between 3 and 6 am are negative.
Note that now a device with any efﬁciency can derive revenue.
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yearly unmodiﬁed 2013 spot prices. Then the 2013 spot market price is modiﬁed so that
the lowest 56 h of electricity prices during the year are assigned a negative price, by sub-
tracting an offset value. Figure 7 shows the 2013 yearly spot prices and the modiﬁed
prices when the offset value is £50/MWh. In the original price data, there were three peri-
ods (1.5 h) on the 15 January 2013 which had £0/MWh price. It is thought that these were
missing values rather than zero price events, given the relatively high prices immediately
before and after these periods, and given that they occurred on a Tuesday morning
between 9:30 and 11 am. Accordingly, they were assigned the average of the prices from
9 to 9:30 am and 11–11:30 am.
Using the original electricity prices for 2013 and again simulating a 75% efﬁcient 200 kWh
50 kW energy storage device, we ﬁnd the available revenue over the course of the year is
£1317. Figure 8 shows how this varies as the round-trip efﬁciency of the device is varied. We
observe that the maximum available revenue is highly correlated with EES efﬁciency.
We then run the simulation (again for a 200 kWh 50 kW as well as a 100 kWh 50 kW
device) with the 2013 spot prices but the minimum priced 56 h are made negative by sub-
tracting an offset value. These minimum 56 h represent 0.64% of the hours in the year.
The effect of the offset value is investigated as well as EES device efﬁciency. Figure 9(a)
and (b) shows the results of the simulations. The y-axis shows the offset used and the x-
axis is the simulated EES efﬁciency. Table 1 shows the average value of the negative price
periods throughout the year for each offset value.
The ﬁgures illustrate that the presence of a small amount of negatively priced periods
leads to a signiﬁcant increase in the revenue available to storage operators. This is true
even if these prices are on average only slightly negative and increases with the ‘degree of
negativity’. For example, the 75% efﬁcient 200 kWh 50 kW has an increase in available
yearly revenue of 5.8% (from £1317 to £1393) when the lowest 56 h of yearly prices are
offset by −£30/MWh and an increase of 13.7% to (from £1317 to £1497) when they are
offset by −£70/MWh. The ﬁgures also show that predominantly higher efﬁciency devices
have higher available arbitrage revenues. The only exception to this in the simulations is
the case of EES devices with small capacity to power ratios and efﬁciencies less than
40%.
Figure 7. Comparing the original and ‘modiﬁed’ yearly prices.
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3. Discussions and conclusions
It is clear that when all electricity prices are positive, arbitrage favours the use of more-
efﬁcient EES devices. Indeed, with an efﬁciency below the ratio of the lowest to highest
electricity prices, there is no ability to generate revenue once the round-trip efﬁciency
losses have been accounted for. The introduction of negative electricity prices changes this,
however, as storage is paid to charge as well as discharge and this allows even the most
inefﬁcient devices to gain some revenue. Our simulations suggest that it only takes a small
number of periods with negative prices to lead to a signiﬁcant increase in the revenue
available to EES. This is because when EES is paid to charge as well as discharge, the
value of each MWh passing through the storage device is increased compared to the case
of exploiting typical daily price differentials.
As discussed in Section 2, it is possible that during a sustained period of stable negative
electricity prices energy storage could derive revenue by charging and discharging (at these
Figure 8. Arbitrage revenue available for a 200 kWh 50 kW energy storage device. As can be seen the revenue
available is heavily dependent on the device efﬁciency, with low-efﬁciency devices having very little revenue
available.
Figure 9. (a) surface plot of revenue available for a 200 kWh 50 kW storage system with the modiﬁed 2013
spot prices. (b) equivalent plot for a 50 kWh 50 kW device.
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negative price periods). This represents an extreme case, technically possible, but unlikely
to appear in the real world.
Most previous articles on energy storage and arbitrage suggest efﬁciency is an essential
factor in a device’s ability to generate revenue [1,2], and so devices intended to proﬁt from
this method should have the maximum possible efﬁciency. The work reported here concurs
when all electricity prices are positive; but in the presence of a small number of negative
electricity prices even low-efﬁciency EES devices can derive revenue from electricity arbi-
trage. It is also possible that these negative prices can encourage inefﬁciency in EES
devices when storage is acting in an economically rational manner (buying low-cost and
selling high-cost electricity). Our simulations suggest, however, that this is unlikely to be
the case given the possible low frequency of negative prices. Devices used for electricity
arbitrage are also anticipated to require high energy capacity to power ratios and our simu-
lations suggest that inefﬁciency is not promoted for these devices. For the yearly simula-
tions, the only situation in which lower efﬁciency EES devices have larger available
revenues is for very small energy capacity to power ratios and very inefﬁcient devices (see
ﬁgure 9(b)).
Therefore, negative electricity prices can be viewed as additional bonus revenue for
EES, given the likely low frequency of these events. This suggests that the market still
favours efﬁcient energy storage devices over their less-efﬁcient counterparts.
In short, negative spot prices are always likely to provide additional revenue to energy
storage operators, but because negative spot prices are likely to be infrequent, they will
probably not have a major impact on technology choices.
Of course, the participation of enough energy storage capacity in the electricity market
would stop prices from reaching negative levels. Competing storage devices would bid to
charge on low-cost electricity, driving the prices up. If this level of storage was to be
achieved, then it could be regarded as a market success and the energy network would
have a sufﬁcient level of ﬂexibility.
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